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Introduction 
A major problem of science is the ordering of relevant data. 
Students of formal organizations currently face this problem because 
of the rapid accumulation of data about organizational behavior. 
Lacking a viable framework for integrating more or less disparate 
findings, the very magnitude of the data has led as much to con- 
fusion as to clarification. 
Our attempt at a theory of formal organizations includes, as a 
first step, the development of a taxonomy which will allow us to or- 
der relevant data. 
ture of organizational procedures and the nature of the organiza- 
This taxonomy is based on two variables, the na- 
tion's resources. 
yields information not only about bureaucratic structures but also 
about the manner in which authority is exercised in these struc- 
tures. 
Classifying organizations by these two variables 
Further, use of the taxonomy allows us to make inferences 
about the environmental conditions associated with the emergence'of 
the various bureaucratic structures. 
tures, however, we will make explicit our assumptions about the na- 
Before discussing these struc- 
ture of formal organizations. 
Almost everyone would agree that formal organizations are sys- 
tems (i.e., they have a more or less enduring differentiation of 
structure and function) and that they are deliberately formed to 
achieve a goal. For instance, Blau states that formal organizations 
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A major problem of science i s  the order ing of r e l evan t  data. 
Students  of formal organizat ions cu r ren t ly  f ace  t h i s  problem because 
o f  the  rap id  accumulation of data about organiza t iona l  behavior. 
Lacking a v i ab le  framework f o r  i n t eg ra t ing  more or l e s s  d i spa ra t e  
f indings,  t he  very magnitude of t he  da ta  has l ed  as much t o  con- 
fus ion  as t o  c l a r i f i c a t i o n .  
Our at tempt  a t  a theory of formal organizat ions includes,  as a 
f irst  s tep ,  t he  development of a taxonomy which w i l l  a l low us  t o  or- 
der  re levant  data. This taxonomy i s  based on two var iab les ,  the  na- 
ture of organiza t iona l  procedures and the  na ture  of t he  organiza- 
t i o n ' s  resources.  
y i e l d s  information not  only about bureaucra t ic  s t r u c t u r e s  but  a l s o  
about the  manner i n  wnich autlnority i s  exercised i n  these  s t ruc-  
t u r e s .  Further ,  use of t he  taxonomy allows us t o  make inferences 
about t h e  environmental conditions assoc ia ted  with the  emergence of 
t h e  var ious  bureaucra t ic  s t ruc tu res .  Before d iscuss ing  these  s t ruc -  
t u re s ,  however, we w i l l  make e x p l i c i t  our assumptions about the  na- 
t u r e  of formal organizat ions.  
Class i fy ing  organizat ions by these  two va r i ab le s  
Almost everyone would agree t h a t  formal organizat ions a r e  sys- 
tems ( i . e . ,  they have a more or l e s s  enduring d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  of 
s t r u c t u r e  and func t ion )  and tha t  they a r e  d e l i b e r a t e l y  formed t o  
achieve a goal. For instance,  Blau s t a t e s  t h a t  formal organizat ions 
a r e  s 
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, i a l  units 'I. . . establ ished f o r  the  e x p l i c i t  purpose of 
achieving c e r t a i n  goals.  "' Barnard def ines  formal organizat ion as a 
. . . system of consciously coordinated a c t i v i t i e s  or forces  of two 11 
114 or more persons. Based on these d e f i n i t i o n s  it seems c l e a r  t h a t  
organizat ions a r i s e  when someone expends resources  and e s t ab l i shes  
some procedures f o r  t h e i r  use, i n  order  t o  achieve h i s  goal.  
a t t e n t i o n  has been paid,  however, t o  who provides the  resources  and 
what p a r t  of t h e  system, or s o c i a l  u n i t ,  has property r i g h t s  with 
regard t o  those resources.  This i s  an important considerat ion,  f o r  
only those who have rights t o  the resources  have l eg i t ima te  l e g a l  
or s o c i e t a l  sanct ions a t  t h e i r  d i sposa l  t o  enforce procedures for 
t h e i r  use. I n  other  words only the  holder of t h e  property r i g h t s  i s  
s o c i a l l y  sanctioned t o  impart d i r ec t ion  t o  the  system. 
who by v i r t u e  of h i s  r i g h t s  t o  the  o rgan iza t ion ' s  resources  has the  
r i g h t  t o  shape and mold (as well as t o  d isso lve ,  s e l l  or otherwise 
t r a n s f e r )  t he  organizat ion t o  a t t a i n  his goal i s  i n  essence the  
owner(s) of t he  organizat ion.  
a small group, l i k e  a committee or a board; or t h e  t o t a l  c i t i z e n r y  of 
a nat ion.  
L i t t l e  
The person(s)  
The owner may be a s i n g l e  ind iv idua l ;  
5 
The a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  formal organizat ions a r e  owned means t h a t  
formal organizat ions can be t r ea t ed  as property.  
m a l  organizat ions are property i s  a c e n t r a l  assumption of t h i s  theory 
and s ince  proper ty  has many meanings for many people it i s  e s s e n t i a l  
t o  c a r e f u l l y  explore what we mean by the  terms "property" and "prop- 
e r t y  r i g h t s .  '' 
The view t h a t  for- 
According t o  Kingsley Davis, p roper ty  ' f cons i s t s  of t h e  rights 
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and d u t i e s  of one person or group ( t h e  owner) as aga ins t  a l l  o ther  
persons o r  groups w i t h  r e spec t  t o  some scarce good. 'I6 This d e f i n i t i o n  
of  property includes s o c i e t a l  as w e l l  as l e g a l  sanct ions.  The char- 
a c t e r i s t i c s  of  property rights a r e  t h a t  they a r e  t r ans fe rab le  ( e i t h e r  
by exchange o r  transmission from one generat ion t o  the  next)  and t h a t  
they do not  imply a c t u a l  use of the  ob jec t  by the  owner. I n  discuss-  
ing  whether property r i g h t s  r e fe r  only t o  concrete ex te rna l  ob jec t s  
Davis s t a t e s  that "What property r i g h t s  r e a l l y  r e f e r s  t o  i n  a l l  
cases  i s  the  r i g h t  t o  demand ce r t a in  kinds of behavior from other  in-  
d iv idua ls .  . . . I f 7  Davis a l s o  d i s t ingu i shes  between two types of 
property:  publ ic  and p r iva t e .  "The term ' p r i v a t e  proper ty '  should 
apply t o  rights by ind iv idua ls  o r  groups a c t i n g  i n  t h e i r  own i n t e r e s t ,  
and 'publ ic  proper ty '  should apply t o  r i g h t s  he ld  by the  community- 
a t - l a r g e  and administered by ind iv idua ls  o r  groups ac t ing  as agents  
of  t h e  community. 
.. 
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I n  d iscuss ing  the  property r i g h t s  i n  productive technology, Davis 
s t a t e s  t h a t  " there  are always ( i t a l i c s  ours )  two mutually contradic-  
t o r y  p r i n c i p l e s  a t  work: (1) the tendency of men t o  r e t a i n  t h e i r  
r i g h t s  i n  productive property but t o  l e t  o the r s  work it for  them; 
( 2 )  t h e  tendency of those who work t h e  property t o  acquire  rights i n  
it. The f i r s t  i s  made poss ib le  by t h e  s e p a r a b i l i t y  of use and owner- 
sh ip ;  the  second by a counteract ing a f f i n i t y  between the  two. 'I9 
f u r t h e r  s t a t e s  t h a t  t he  persons a c t u a l l y  connected with the  product ive 
He 
instruments a r e  i n  a pos i t i on  to  use them for t h e i r  own advantage as 
aga ins t  t he  advantage of the  t i t u l a r  owner, i . e . ,  "the share  of t he  
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product t h a t  goes t o  c a p i t a l  may not  always be forthcoming i f  the  per- 
sons who furn ish  the  c a p i t a l  stand a p a r t  from the  production i t s e l f .  '"O 
Our conception of formal organization, i .e . ,  one t h a t  includes 
an  owner, i s  based on t h e  premise t h a t  a formal organizat ion i s  prop- 
e r t y  and t h a t  the property r igh t s  i n  them a re  t r ans fe rab le  e i t h e r  by 
exchange o r  by transmission from one generation t o  the  next.  We 
recognize t h a t  t h e  owner need not a c t u a l l y  manage or operate  t h e  or- 
ganization--he can allow the property t o  be operated by a manager or  
d i r ec to r .  We f u r t h e r  assume, following Davis, t h a t  property r i g h t s  
a r e  not  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  concrete objec ts  but include the  r i g h t  t o  demand 
c e r t a i n  kinds of behavior from other individuals .  Spec i f ica l ly ,  we 
a r e  thinking of t h e  owner's r i gh t  t o  demand c e r t a i n  kinds of behavior 
LL 
from h i s  labor  force,  h i s  human resources.  A t  t h e  same time, how- 
ever,  we recognize t h a t  t he  r i g h t  may or may not  be honored, because, 
following Davis, w e  assume t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a tendency fo r  those who 
work the  property t o  acquire  rights i n  it. The owner of a formal or- 
ganizat ion,  then, has a dual  problem: (1) t o  u t i l i z e  h i s  property so  
t h a t  h i s  goals a r e  a t t a ined ;  and ( 2 )  t o  prevent the erosion of h i s  
r i g h t s  by those who operate  the property.  
I n  summary, ownership of a formal organizat ion r e s ides  with the  
person or  persons who have property r i g h t s  t o  the t o t a l  organization. 
The owner's resources a r e  the  elements t h a t  comprise the  formal or- 
ganizat ion;  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  of s t ruc tu re  and funct ion a r i s e ,  i n  p a r t  
a t  l e a s t ,  as a r e s u l t  of the procedures es tab l i shed  by him. 
. .  
Defini t ion:  Formal Organization. A formal organizat ion i s  a , .  , ?  . .  
purposely developed system, i .e . ,  an ongoing in t e rac t ion  of procedures 
and resources,  t o  which an owner has  property r igh t s .  
* 
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We assume t h a t  t h e  reason an owner seeks t o  a t t a i n  h i s  goal by 
c r e a t i n g  (using, buying, renting, e t c . )  an organization i s  t o  ob- 
t a i n  the  economic o r  psychological advantages t h a t  r e s u l t  from c- 
ordinat ion.  We f u r t h e r  assume t h a t  the  r a t i o n a l  owner aims t o  
achieve h i s  goal  i n  as  e f f i c i e n t  a manner as is  possible  and t o  pre- 
vent  t he  operators  of the  organization from usurping h i s  property 
r i g h t s .  When t h e  owner decides t o  a t t a i n  h i s  goals through organ- 
i z a t i o n  he acquires  resources necessary f o r  goal  attainment and co- 
o rd ina te s  them i n  productive e f f o r t .  H e  can do t h i s  i n  ways which 
give g rea t e r  o r  lesser d i sc re t ion  t o  t h e  human resources.  Maximal 
d i s c r e t i o n  i s  given labor when the owner informs them of h i s  goal, 
places  c a p i t a l  a t  t h e i r  disposal,  allows them t o  expend it f o r  ma- 
chinery and/or r a w  ma te r i a l  as they see f i t .  
given labor when t h e  owner decides f o r  what and how h i s  c a p i t a l  
w i l l  be expended: when he informs labor of h i s  goal  and a l s o  t e l l s  
them exac t ly  how t o  g e t  there .  
Least d i s c r e t i o n  i s  
Maximal coordination by the owner i s  possible  only when a l l  
d i s c r e t i o n  r e s ides  i n  him. A s  w e  use it, t o  coordinate i s  t o  i m -  
p a r t  d i r e c t i o n  t o  the  system, i . e . ,  t o  spec i fy  procedures for t h e  
u t i l i z a t i o n  of t he  resources of t h e  system. The maximally coordin- 
a t e d  organizat ion i s  the  end po in t  of a continuum and i n  t h e  r e a l  
world usual ly  i s  not  reached. An owner may e i t h e r  choose t o  coor- 
d i n a t e  the resources by himself or delegate  the  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  
coordinate t o  some decision-making components within h i s  organiza- 
t i o n .  The coordinating, decision-making components of t h e  organiza- 
t i o n  c o n s t i t u t e  what we consider t he  managers of t he  organization. 
The coordinating, non-decision-making components c o n s t i t u t e  what we 
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consider t h e  bureaucrats (c le rks ,  bookkeepers, strawbosses, e t c .  ) . 
I n  o the r  words, t he  d i f f e rence  between a manager and a bureaucrat  
i s  t h e  degree of d i s c r e t i o n  each has i n  determining h i s ,  and o thers ,  
organizat ional  a c t i v i t i e s .  Bureaucrats, though engaged i n  t h e  co- 
o rd ina t ing  process, have l i t t l e  or no d i s c r e t i o n  i n  the  performance 
o f  t h e i r  functions,  nor do they determine the  a c t i v i t i e s  of o thers .  
Managers, on t h e  other  hand, have some d i s c r e t i o n  over t h e i r  own 
a c t i v i t i e s  and a l s o  determine the a c t i v i t i e s  of bureaucrats (and 
o t h e r s )  i n  t h e  organizations.  Most coordinators f a l l  between the  
extremes of having full d i s c r e t i o n  or no d i sc re t ion .  This varia- 
t i o n  i n  degrees of d i s c r e t i o n  allows us t o  c l a s s i f y  coordinators 
i n  terms of a r a t i o  o f  d i sc re t iona ry  t o  non-discretionary a c t i v i t i e s .  
are operat ional ly  defined according t o  t h e i r  ac- 
t he  organization. 
Persons no t  pr imar i ly  engaged i n  t h e  coordinating process we 
consider producers. Producers work toward t h e  attainment of t he  
owner's goal  d i r e c t l y  through t h e i r  own a c t i v i t i e s  r a t h e r  than by 
f a c i l i t a t i n g  or  increasing t h e  e f f ec t iveness  of t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  of 
o thers .  Consider, f o r  example, t he  d i f f e r e n t  r o l e s  played by t h e  
craftsmen and the  foreman i n  bui lding a house. The foreman, i . e . ,  
the coordinator,  does not  dr ive n a i l s ,  s a w  wood, e t c .  H e  performs 
no a c t  d i r e c t l y ,  tangibly,  immediately r e l a t e d  t o  bui lding a house. 
H i s  contr ibut ion l i e s  i n  increasing the  e f f i c i e n c y  of those who do 
bu i ld  the  house. The house could be  b u i l t  without a coordinator,  
though probably, i t  would be  more cos t ly .  
Producers, l i k e  coordinators, a l s o  have more o r  l e s s  d i sc re -  
t i o n  over t h e i r  organizat ional  a c t i v i t i e s .  Producers who determine 
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t h e i r  own a c t i v i t i e s  (e.g.  , have d i s c r e t i o n ) ,  we designate as pro- 
f e s s iona l s .  '* Producers whose a c t i v i t i e s  are determined by o the r s  
we tern werkers. These f o w  o r g a n i z a t i m a l  roles are determined by 
-
t h e i r  funct ion and manner of performance, as shown i n  Table 1. 
Insert Table 1 about here  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
To t h i s  po in t  we have discussed some assumptions bas i c  t o  our 
view of formal organization. Next w e  w i l l  de f ine  and discuss  the  
v a r i a b l e s  which determine the  bureaucratic s t r u c t u r e s  of formal or- 
ganizations.  
The Variables.  Our premise i s  that  t h e  kind o f  organization 
which develops i s  determined by two va r i ab le s :  
which resources are s to red  i n  specific or  general  form, and (2 )  t he  
(1) the  degree t o  
-
degree t o  which procedures a re  organizat ional ly  specif ied.  
We consider a resource any factor--(  labor  o r  c a p i t a l ) - - t h a t  
produces a good or  se rv ice .  J u s t  as Davis considers "good w i l l "  
an  in t ang ib le  which has associated with it property rights, so  do 
w e  consider as a resource any organizat ional  property,  i n t ang ib le  
o r  not, which i s  exchangeable fo r  c a p i t a l  or t r a n s f e r a b l e  i n  any 
o the r  sense. Both good w i l l  and c red i t  are examples of exchange- 
a b l e  o r  t r ans fe rab le  non-tangible resources.  Property r i g h t s ,  
whether associated with tangible  o r  non-tangible resources,  may 
be owned o u t r i g h t  or they may be leased. Rights t o  owned resources 
may be he ld  i n d e f i n i t e l y  while r i g h t s  t o  leased resources 
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are obtained only f o r  a l imi ted  period of t i m e .  While most re- 
sources can be e i t h e r  leased o r  owned, labor ,  except under unusual 
circumstances , m s  t always be leased. 
Storage of resources  r e f e r s  t o  possession of them during the  
- 
period of t i m e  between t h e i r  acqu i s i t i on  and t h e i r  consumptiLon, We 
de f ine  organiza t iona l  resources a s  those resources which are s to red  
wi th in  an organizat ion.  The "specific-general" dimension is anal -  
ogous t o  the  not ion of committed and uncommitted resources.  When 
a resource is i n  s p e c i f i c  form it is earmarked f o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  
use;  when it is i n  general  form its use is undetermined. The 
analogy is not  a pe r fec t  one, however, because w e  consider t he  
f a c t o r  of s to rage  as w e l l  as commitment i n  our concept. 
Defini t ion:  Specific-General Resources. Any resource is a 
s p e c i f i c  one i f  it is stored by an organizat ion i n  the  form neces- 
s a r y  t o  implement a program with the  Owner's i n t e n t i t h a t  it be(,. 
i 
used, modified o r  consumed within the  organizat ion i n  the  process 
of obtaining h i s  goal.  'Any resource is  a general  one i f  ' i t  is 
s t o r e d  by an organizat ion wi th  the expec ta t ion  t h a t  i t  w i l l  be con- 
ver ted  t o  a s p e c i f i c  resource,  
Operat ional ly ,  t h e  r a t i o  of s p e c i f i c  t o  general  resources is 
t h e  present  investment i n  s p e c i f i c  resources over the  present  value 
of general  resources;  where present investment equals i n i t & a l  c o s t  
of the  s p e c i f i c  resources times the  unused proportion of those re- 
sources;  and where present  value equals market p r i c e  of t he  general  
9 
resources.  
payment [ r e n t a l  f ee ,  con t r ac t  o r  s a l a r y ]  times the  remaining unex- 
p i r ed  percentage of t he  l ea se  period.) 
Uncommitted money, o r  t he  a b i l i t y  t o  borrow, is the  most usual 
genera l  resource. However, organizat ions which u t i l i z e  and consume 
money wi th in  the  organizat ion t o  implement a program a t  the  behest  
of an Owner a l s o  can store i t  as a s p e c i f i c  resource. Money might 
be a s p e c i f i c  resource t o  a lending i n s t i t u t i o n  or foundation be- 
cause t h e i r  programs requi re  i t s  consumption by o r  with in  the  or- 
ganiza t ion  r a t h e r  than i t s  conversion t o  another  resource.  
these i n s t i t u i o n s ,  however, may maintain money ps a general  resource 
if they store it pr ior  t o  determining i t s  use. 
(The present  investment i n  leased' resources is the  t o t a l  
Even 
Labor usua l ly  is a spec i f i c  resource; however, i t  too, can be 
a general  resource. 
p layer  merely f o r  t r ad ing  purposes, t h a t  p layer  is s tored  as a gen- 
eral  resource u n t i l  a t rade  involving t h a t  p layer  is made. I f  no 
t r a d e  is completed, t he  p layer  can be converted t o  a spec f i c  re- 
source by deciding t o  use him on the  team--by f i a t  a l l o c a t i n g  him 
f o r  consumption by o r  wi th in  the organizat ion.  
For example, when a baseba l l  team buys a 
me lending i n s t i t u t i o n  example i l l u s t r a t e s  how a usua l ly  gen- 
eral  resource can be employed as a s p e c i f i c  one; t he  baseba l l  team 
i l l u s t r a t e s  how a normally s p e c i f i c  resource can be used a s  a gen- 
e r a l  one. I n  both cases  the  resources can be converted from one 
form t o  another,  by the  Owner's f i a t .  
cases ,  however, f o r  usua l ly  money is a general  resource and labor  
These are except ional  
LU 
a spec i f  i c o n e .  Conversion of resources from one form to 
another by fiat also is rare because conversion frequently involves 
recourse to the goods and services of an individual outside the 
organization or to another, autonomous organization. 
The second variable is the degree to which procedures are 
self- or organizationally-specified. A procedure is self deter- 
mined when the human is given discretion in achieving the organi- 
zation's goal. He is given general instructions to achieve an 
organizational objective but is not given specific instructions 
about how to achieve it. The former we refer to as a general 
procedure, the latter a specified one. Procedures are conceived 
of as distributed on a continuum from absolutely specified to 
totally generalized. 
Definition: Specified-Generalized Procedures. Procedures 
are completely specified when an owner. or his agent, requires a 
volitional resource to perform a series of planned activities 
such that the entire working period is consumed in the perform- 
ance of those behaviors. Procedures are completely generalized 
when the volitional resource is required by the owner to specify 
all his own procedures in attaining the organization's goal. 
Operationally, the ratio of specified to generalized proce- 
dures is the proportion of time volitional resources spend carrying 
out procedures planned by others above them in the administrative 
hierarchy over the total time spent on organizational activities. 14 
I .  
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We hypothesize that the structure of the formal organization 
and its concomitant authority pattern is der>endent on the ratio 
of specified to generalized procedures and on the ratio of stored 
specific to stored general resources. 
The variables, proportion of procedures which are specified, 
and proportion of resources stored in specific form are continu- 
ously distributed. Nevertheless, for expository purposes we will 
consider .only the end points of these two continua. Where P+ 
stands for a high proportion of specified procedures and P- for 
a low proportion, and where R+ stands for a high proportion of 
stored specific resources and R- for a low proportion, there are 
four possible combinations of procedures and resources: (1) P+R+; 
(2) PM-; (3) P-R+; (4) P-R-. 
In the first situation, Pa+, a high proportion of the 
procedures are specified and a high proportion of the resources 
are stored in their specific forms. The P+R+ organization is 
exemplified by an automated factory in which all the machinery and 
people necessary to achieve the goals of the organization are 
stored, and where all their activities are planned or programmed. 
In the second situation, P M - ,  the owner specifies a high 
proportion of the procedures, but he stores a low proportion of the 
organization's resources in specific form. In the construction 
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industry, for instance, the owner does not know whether he will use 
glass, brick or cement on his fbture construction projects. To 
store all resources for any construction exigency would obviously 
be costly and for most contractors, impossible. This is true of 
any industry, such as fashion or show business, which has a rela- 
tively unpredictable demand. 
The third case, P-R+, is one where the owner stores the spe- 
cific resources necessary to goal achievement but he does not or 
cannot specify the procedures for their coordination. Hospitals, 
research organizations, universities, are more or less character- 
istic of this type of organization. In these organizations re- 
sources are stored in specific form (surgical instruments, doctors, 
computers, professors, etc.) but the owner does not specify their 
use. 
The last situation, P-R-, where there are few specified pro- 
cedures and few specific resources is one where there is low prob- 
ability of the emergence of a viable organization. With little 
planning and few resources to coordinate there is little reason to 
maintain even the semblance of a formal organization. Other than 
this last case, each of the (idealized) combinations of procedures 
and resources results in a distinctive pattern of formal organiza- 
tion. 
Bureaucratic Structures 
The Complete Bureaucracy. The most widely discussed type of 
formal organization is the monocratic, bureaucratic organization. 
Weber states that one characteristic of monocratic bureaucracies is 
t h a t  they a r e  "organized i n  a c l ea r ly  defined hierarchy of o f f i -  
ces. '"' He a l s o  s t a t e s  t h a t  t h i s  form of organizat ion i s  'I. . . 
capable of a t t a i n i n g  the  highest  degree of e f f i c i ency  and i s  . . . 
t h e  most r a t i o n a l  known means of car ry ing  out  imperative con t ro l  
over human beings. 'I1' This can be taken t o  mean tha t ,  among other  
things,  bureaucracy i s  a control  mechanism t o  insure coordination. 1.7 
I n  Weber's formulation coordination and cont ro l  a r e  achieved within 
the  framework of an executive au thor i ty  pa t te rn .  Marcson descr ibes  
this au tho r i ty  p a t t e r n  as "a system of cont ro ls  i n  which a superior  
i n  a h i e r a r c h i c a l  organizat ion exerc ises  u l t imate  con t ro l  over h i s  
subordinates.  It i s  . . . based on incumbancy i n  a pos i t i on  and 
occurs within the  framework of pre-ex is t ing  r u l e s  of the organiza- 
t ion .  ,118 
The Weberian i d e a l  bureaucracy e x i s t s  only when the  owner (or  
h i s  sur roga te)  does the  following two things:  
t i v e  con t ro l  over and coordinates the a c t i v i t i e s  of ( 2 )  the people 
and t o o l s  necessary t o  achieve the  goals of t he  organization. Ef-  
f e c t i v e  executive con t ro l  and coordination i s  dependent upon exten- 
s ive  planning. Planning and coordination only can be ca r r i ed  out  
when people and o ther  resources necessary t o  plan and carry out  t h a t  
coordination a r e  ava i l ab le  within the  organizat ion.  Thus, condi- 
t i o n s  necessary fo r  the  emergence of an organiza t iona l  form approx- 
imating the  Weberian Model are, i n  our terminology, a high propor- 
t i o n  of spec i f i ed  procedures (P+), 
(1) exerc ises  execu- 
and a high proport ion of s tored  
s p e c i f i c  resources  (R+). The Weberian i d e a l  bureaucracy can only 
occur when v i r t u a l l y  a l l  procedures a r e  spec i f i ed  and a l l  resources  
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required f o r  goal achievement a re  s tored  i n  s p e c i f i c  form. We term 
t h i s  kind of organizat ion a Complete Bureaucracy. 
Def in i t ion :  Complete Bureaucracy. A Complete Bureaucracy i s  
a formal organizat ion which i n  the  process of goal attainment 
s t o r e s  a l l  t he  managerial h ie rarch ies  necessary t o  maximize coor- 
d ina t ion  and control .  
A s  we previously implied, one of  the  c l o s e s t  approximations t o  
t h e  Complete Bureaucracy i s  the automated fac tory .  Here the  ac t iv -  
i t i e s  of a l l  t he  resources,  including the human ones who tend the  
machines--push buttons,  watch for red l i g h t s ,  e t c .  --are completely 
programmed. Almost a l l  the  resources a r e  s tored  i n  s p e c i f i c  form 
and almost a l l  the  procedures a re  spec i f ied .  The procedures a re  
spec i f i ed  by the  owner and (genera l ly)  through a chief executive 
down the  h i e r a r c h i c a l  l e v e l s  t o  t he  worker. This kind of au tho r i ty  
p a t t e r n  has been ca l l ed  an executive au tho r i ty  p a t t e r n  and we asso- 
c i a t e  i t  with the  Complete Bureaucracy. Although a Complete Bureauc- 
racy maximizes coordination, of ten it i s  undesirable  o r  impossible 
f o r  t h e  owner t o  specify a high proport ion of the  procedures o r  t o  
s t o r e  s p e c i f i c  resources.  Not doing one or t h e  other  modifies t h e  
Complete Bureaucracy. 
The Truncated Bureaucracy. F i r s t ,  l e t  us examine the  e f f e c t  on 
the  organizat ion of not  s to r ing  a high proport ion of s p e c i f i c  re-  
sources.  A s  we s t a t e d  e a r l i e r  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  i s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of 
i ndus t r i e s ,  such as fashion and construct ion,  which have r e l a t i v e l y  
unpredictable  demand. It is  our contention t h a t  when demand i s  un- 
p red ic t ab le  human resources a r e  among the  f i r s t  s p e c i f i c  resources  
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not t o  be stored. This is so  because humans are  one o f t h e  more 
expensive resources t o  store.  
due t o  the fac t  tha t  human resources cannot, except i n  unusual 
circumstances, be owned outright. 
be leased. 
the rate a t  which they lose value when in  use and when not i n  use. 
Owned resources tend t o  depreciate more slowly when not used. 
the other hand, because the r e n t  f o r  leased property remains constant 
the r a t e  of depreciation of leased property is unaffected by use. 
Therefore, per dol lar  invested it frequently costs more t o  s tore  
leased resources than owned resources .19 Consequently, when demand 
is  unpredictable, i.e., when t h e  probability of non-use of stored 
specific resources is high, human resources are  among the first not 
stored by the  organization. 
The high storage costs primarily are  
Human resources almost always m u s t  
A major difference between owned and leased resources is 
On 
Generally, the more unique the  s k i l l  of the  resource, the less 
available it i s  and the more costly it is t o  replace. As a result 
an owner prefers t o  s tore  unique o r  d i f f icu l t  t o  obtain resources 
i n  preference t o  less  unique or easi ly  obtained resources. 
the most unique s k i l l s  a human resource can possess is knowledge of 
how and why a particular formal organization operates. This applies 
with greater generality t o  the manager than t o  the worker--with 
greater generality the closer each hierarchy is t o  the top of the 
organization. Not only does t h e  uniqueness of s k i l l s  increase as 
One of 
one moves from the lowest t o  the highest administrative levels, 
the responsibility f o r  coordination and planning also increases. 
Consequently, the potential  benefits t o  be derived from the 
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coordination and planning associated with each bureaucratic leve l  
increases from the lowest t o  the highest administrative levels. 
Thus, owners prefer t o  s tore  higher ievei  managers t o  lower leve l  
ones. When a l l  necessary levels are stored the higher ones are  
leased for  longer periods of time. That is, high leve l  managers 
are contracted fo r  by the year and lower level  ones hired by the 
month o r  week. The tendency of organizations with unpredictable 
demand not t o  s tore  lower administrative levels (or i f  stored, t o  
lease them fo r  shorter periods of t i m e )  i s  reinforced by the fac t  
tha t  storage costs vary inversely with level.  
sa lar ies  of an en t i re  level  generally exceed the combined sala- 
That is, the  combired 
r i e s  of the en t i re  leve l  above it.20 The 
s tore  the lower levels results i n  what w e  
racy. 21  
Definition: Truncated Bureaucracy. 
fa i lure  o r  inabi l i ty  t o  
c a l l  a Truncated Bureauc- 
A Truncated Bureaucracy 
is  a formal Organization where one or more of the lowest managerial 
levels necessary t o  maximize coordination and control i n  the pro- 
duction of a good or  service are not permanently stored within the 
organization. 
Where the  lower administrative levels needed f o r  coordination 
and control are not stored within the organization and cannot be 
obtained on demand, the i r  functions must be performed by persons 
outside the organization .22 In the  construction industry, the 
craft union, i n  large measure, has f i l f i l l e d  these functions. It 
i s  d i f f i cu l t  f o r  organizations other than c raf t  unions t o  judge the 
ab i l i t y  of workers who move from job t o  job i n  the practice of 
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t h e i r  occupations. 
t h e  r a t i n g  of employees based on t h a t  d e f i n i t i o n  i s  an administra- 
t i v e  service performed by the  c r a f t  union f o r  t h e  owner of t h e  
formal organization. The c r a f t  unions then, perform a dual func- 
t i on .  
with t h e  formal organization.and on t h e  o t h e r  they funct ion as an 
adminis t ra t ive  adjunct t o  t h e  organization. 
are performed ou t s ide  t h e  truncated bureaucracy w e  charac te r ize  the  
a t tendant  au tho r i ty  p a t t e r n  as an executive-external one. 
t h e  importance of t h e  ex terna l  authori ty  and t h e  consequent loss of 
au tho r i ty  by t h e  owner i s  d i r e c t l y  r e l a t ed  t o  t h e  degree of 
t runcat ion.  
The d e f i n i t i o n  of  acceptable performance and 
On t h e  one hand, they represent t h e i r  members i n  bargaining 
Since these  funct ions 
Obviously 
Thus, when procedures a r e  highly spec i f i ed  and resources are 
s to red  i n  general  r a t h e r  than  spec i f i c  form (P+R-) t h e  departure  
from a Complete Bureaucracy occurs through a t runca t ion  of t h e  
lower adminis t ra t ive  l eve l s .  The pa t t e rn  of au thor i ty  associated 
wi th  t h i s  form of bureaucracy i s  t h e  executive-external au thor i ty  
pa t te rn .  This departure  from the  Complete Bureaucracy d i f f e r s  
r a d i c a l l y  from the  one observed when procedures are not highly 
spec i f i ed  and when resources are  s tored  i n  s p e c i f i c  form (P-R+). 
The Enucleated Bureaucracy. I n  a P-R+ organizat ion t h e  
owner does not t e l l  t h e  v o l i t i o n a l  resources how t o  achieve t h e  
organiza t ion ' s  goals, but  mere ly  tel ls  them what they are. 
t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  t h e  owner relies on t h e  s p e c i f i c  resources t o  spe- 
c i f y  t h e i r  own procedures, t o  decide how, when, and wi th  what t o  
achieve the  organizat ion 's  goals. 
I n  
An example of such an 
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organization might be a small school, whose owner gathers together 
ten professors, a building, a library, pencils and paper. "Teach 
the youth of the country the wisdom of the ages; teach them how to 
think," he states as the goal of the organization. 
attempting to implement the Owner's aims each professor utilizes 
Of course, in 
his own methods. 
each professor specifies his own procedures. 
No one tells him how to transmit his wisdom; 
Conforming to our 
definitions of organizational roles, the producers in our hypo- 
thetical school are, therefore, professionals rather than workers. 
Where producers specie their own procedures the necessity 
for a coordinator is, of course, sharply reduced. Self-regulation, 
however, generally is not so extensive that some coordination of 
resources is not beneficial. Where it is beneficial the profes- 
sionals tend to coordinate themselves since only they can anticipate 
which procedures they will employ and which resources they win 
need. The faculty in this case, acting as a collegial group, deter- 
mines the allocation of resources and regulates the use of common 
resources such as classrooms. 
In the P-R+ organization we have described, the need for 
coordination is reduced and where necessary, self-coordination 
occurs. Therefore, the number of managerial levels between the 
owner(s) and the producers is sharply reduced. In fact, if each 
volitional resource specified a l l  his own procedures, all levels -
between the m e r  and the producers would be or should be elimi- 
nated. Such an organization we call a totally Enucleated 
Bureaucracy. Though the extreme enucleation which w e  have 
described rarely if ever occurs, approximations are readily 
found i n  professional organizations such as law firms and medical 
groups, universities, research inst i tutes ,  etc.  
Definition: Totally Enucleated Bureaucracy. A tot- 
Enucleated Bureaucracy is a formal organization where rtll of the 
hierarchic levels necessary t o  maximize coordination and control 
are eliminated between the owner and the producers. 
To the extent tha t  the producers coordinate the i r  own activi-  
ties they perform the function of the enucleated bureaucratic levels. 
This coordination is achieved by what w e  term a consensual speci- 
fication of procedures and allocation of resources. Divisions of 
labor are agreed upon, uses of physical f ac i l i t i e s  are planned 
through the professionals' consensus rather than by executive 
directive. When administrative functions are performed by a group 
each member of which has a voice i n  decision-making and when those 
decisions axe based on a consensus, coordination is achieved throy@;h 
collegial  decision-making .23 In the to t a l ly  enucleated bureaucracy 
the professionals constitute such a decision-making body. It seems 
clear then tha t  a colleague authority pattern is associated w i t h  
the to t a l ly  Enucleated Bureaucracy. 
The remaining combination of procedures and resources, P-R- 
is a condition where no formal organization occurs. 
dures are not specified, the hierarchy between the m e r  and the 
If the proce- 
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lowest management levels is enucleated; if resources are not 
stored i n  specific form t h e  lowest levels of management are trun- 
cated; i f  a l l  t he  levels of the hierarchy below the owner are 
excised there can be no formal organization. 
summarized in Table 2. 
-
m e  patterns are 
O p t i m a l  Bureaucratic Structures. Both a Truncated and an 
Enucleated Bureaucracy are modifications of the Complete Bureau- 
cracy. 
conditions suggests tha t  the Complete Bureaucracy is not always 
the optimal organizational form fo r  attaining the owner's goal. 
Indeed, as we w i l l  show, t h e  Complete Bureaucracy rarely, i f  ever, 
is  an optimal form of organization. 
The proposition tha t  these modifications occur under certain 
An optimal bureaucracy i s  one which stores only that  number 
of levels which maximizes the benefits of coordination while the 
Complete Bureaucracy stores a l l  the hierarchical levels necessary 
t o  maximize coordination itself. A maximally coordinated organi- 
zation 1) has available, as they are needed, all the  volit ional 
and non-volitional resources necessary t o  perform a l l  the inter-  
dependent tasks; and 2 )  plans all the  interdependent tasks  t o  the 
extent tha t  the performance of any one of these tasks does not 
hinder the performance of any other and when possible w i l l  enhance 
it. A Complete Bureaucracy not only stores the hierarchies 
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necessary t o  plan a l l  the interactions of the human and non-human 
factors of production but it also stores the hierarchies necessarry 
t o  insure that  planning is  being carried out, thus attaining both 
coordination and control. 
coordination, so are there costs associated with the processes of 
coordinating and controlling, The optimal bureaucracy occurs at  
the point when the gains which would accrue t o  the Owner from 
increased coordination and control are outweighed by the costs of 
obtaining that increase--by the costs of adding an additional 
hierarchical level. 
Just as benefits can be gained from 
One example of movement from a complete tuward a more nearly 
optimal bureaucracy was described in Time Magazine. 
the mer of a retail chain made reductions in coordination and 
control which resulted in a net gain fo r  h i s  organization. 
tory replacement cards, sales receipts, time clocks, etc. were 
eliminated. 
t ion  and control, b u t t h e  m e r  ". . . wiped out so much record 
keeping tha t  he has junked 120 tons of paper forms, saved $14 
million. 
18s. sales increase. . Some ,8,000 jobs aut of 28,000 have been 
eliminated. . . w24 Each of the changes made h ' this case eUmi- 
nated a specified procedure and so decreased the  r a t io  of specified 
t o  generalized procedures. 
discretion t o  the lower administrative levels tended t o  change the 
organization from a more complete toward a more enucleated one. 
In t he  example 
Inven- 
Undoubtedly, there w a s  some loss due t o  less  coordina- 
H e  w a s  able t o  cut prices 5% and w a s  rewarded with an 
I n  effect, the granting of increased 
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Whether change toward  optfmality takes the form of greater 
enucleation, as i n  the example, or  of greater truncation generally 
i s  detemined by the nature o f t h e  organization's interaction wi th  
its extern83 envlronment. 2 5  
f y  procedures is directly related t o  the complexity of the organiza- 
t ion 's  interaction wi th  the environment. Complexity increases as 
1) there is an increase in the number of environmental factors t o  
be considered before an appropriate response can be selected; 
and/or 2) there is  an increase i n  the intricacy and diff icul ty  of 
t he  response. Stocking a nation-wide chain of supermarkets is an 
exanrple of a complex interaction on an environmental level, while 
surgical remova2 of a cancer exemplifies a complex interaction on 
a response, o r  procedural, level. When the interaction is complex 
and rapid specification of procedures is  required of the  organiza- 
tion, the  owner is forced t o  allow the lower hierarchic levels t o  
specify their own procedures, an occurrence which tends t o  enucleate 
the bureaucracy . 
The speed With whic4 an owngr can apeci- 
Given the tendency t o  enucleate, coordination by means of a 
colleague system is desireable if the producers in the organization 
share common resources. Because the  producers, in th i s  case 
professionals, spec ie  the i r  own procedures, only they can deter- 
mine what resources they w i l l  need. 
t o  allocal;e these resources across the  ent i re  organization, ( i  .e., 
Further, they are best able 
among themselves)., and so take advantage of economies of scale. 
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However, coordination by a collegial system depends on the emergence 
of consensus and so is a time consuming mechanism. 
the collegial  system of coordination is efficient t o  the extent 
tha t  resource reqyirements are relatively stable. 
Consepently, 
An mucleated Bureaucracy, employing a collegial  system, fac i l -  
i t a t e s  rapid specification of procedures but limits the rapidity 
w i t h  which resources can be converted. 
resources and rapid specification of procedures are required, 
alternate, more complex organizational structures must be employed. 
However, as w e  l a t e r  w i l l  demonstrate, these structures f'urther 
reduce the benefits of coordination. Enucleation of the Bureau- 
cracy, then, fs optimal a)  when environmental interaction is 
complex, making m e r  specification of procedures diff icul t ;  and 
b) when there is need f o r  rapid response, making Owner specifica- 
t ion nearly impossible. 
by a collegial  system is optimal a) when t h e  professionals share 
common resources; and b )  when the resource requirements are stable. 
When both rapid change of 
Coordinating an Enucleated Bureaucracy 
In addition t o  complexity, the interaction between an organi- 
zation and its external environment also can be characterized by 
its diversity. By diversity we mean an environmental state where 
for  goal achievement there must be performed a number of different 
f'unctions each rewir ing a more o r  less  different s e t  of procedures 
and resources. That is, given one envlronmental condition the  
Owner achieves h i s  goal by ut i l iz ing one subset of procedures and 
resources and given a different environmental condition he employs 
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a separate subset of procedures and resources. 
the interaction the more diverse w i l l  be the  resources required for  
goal attainment by the organization. 
fo r  each of the diverse m e t i o n s  the greater are the  costs and 
risks associated with storing all the necessary resources. 
the storage costs outweigh the benefits of coordination the owner 
should obtain the necessary volitional and nonvolitional resources 
only a f t e r  the demand for  them has been made. This would tend t o  
truncate the bureaucracy. 
i n  addition the environment is unstable the optimal organizational 
form tends toward a Truncated Bureaucracy. 
The more diverse 
The more sporadic the demand 
When 
-
Thus, when interaction is diverse and 
This tendency is  mitigated, however, i f  the organization is 
forced t o  respond rapidly t o  environmental demands. 
time t o  acquire resources so i n  order t o  respond rapidly the 
organization must have on hand the resources necessary t o  make 
any of i t s  diverse responses. Storage of large quantities of 
alternative specific resources which perform no immediate function, 
and indeed may never perform a fhc t ion ,  is costly. H i g h l y  diverse 
interaction, coupled with sporadic demand and the necessity for  
rapid response, normally increases the  cost of storage of a l l  the 
necessary resources t o  the point where Organization does not occur. 
There are, however, some instances where the  possible costs of not 
storing all alternative resources are so great tha t  they outweigh 
the costs of storing them. 
military establishment which must be prepared t o  respond rapidly 
It takes 
This is  particularly true of the 
t o  a highly d iverse  
t i o n s  i s  sporadic.  
timony t o  the  c o s t s  
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environment and where demand f o r  m i l i t a r y  func- 
The sale of surp lus  m i l i t a r y  equipment is t e s -  
of s t o r i n g  a l t e r n a t i v e  resources.  Only under 
such extraordinary condi t ions does s t o r i n g  of a l l  a l t e r n a t e  re-  
sources  reduce the  degree of truncation. Ordinar i ly  the  c o s t s  of 
such s torage  prevent organization. 
I n  summary, a Complete Bureaucracy i s  optimal when the  en- 
vironment is s tab le .  Once t h e  environmental f a c t o r s  i n  a s t a b l e  
environment are understood there  is no need t o  reexamine them. 
A s t a b l e  environment thereby decreases t h e  e f f e c t  of complexity 
of i n t e rac t ion .  Further ,  a s t a b l e  environment by d e f i n i t i o n ,  e l i m -  
i n a t e s  sporadic  demand. Thus, i n  a s t a b l e  environment where the  
owner can spec i fy  t h e  organizat ion 's  responses the  optimal organi- 
za t iona l  form approaches the  Complete Bureaucracy. Since these  
cond i t ions  r a re ly ,  i f  ever,occur, a Complete Bureaucracy r a re ly ,  
i f  ever,  is optimal. 
Movement away from a Complete Bureaucracy depends on the  
i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p  of t h ree  var iab les :  1) complexity of environ- 
mental i n t e rac t ion ;  2) d i v e r s i t y  of environmental i n t e rac t ion ;  
3) the need f o r  rapid response. 
i n t e r a c t i o n  tends toward enucleat ion.  
as a funct ion of t he  need f o r  rapid s p e c i f i c a t i o n  of procedures. 
An increase  i n  the  d i v e r s i t y  of i n t e r a c t i o n  along wi th  sporadic  
demand tends toward t runca t ion .  
An increase  i n  the  complexity of 
The tendency is enhanced 
Complex Organizgtion Structures ,  To t h i s  po in t  w e  have only 
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considered "simple" organizational types and the authority-patterns 
associated with each of them. 
when its authority relationships cannot be described by a single 
authority pattern. An example of such a complex organization is 
a hospital where the administrative group and the group of doctors 
each operate under a different authority pattern, the administra- 
tive group under an executive authority pattern, and the doctors 
under a (more or less) collegial system. Obviously, attainment 
of the hospital's goals is directly dependent on the activities 
of the members of the collegial group. 
istrative component is to facilitate the activities of the col- 
leagues. 
tration are, therefore, dependent on the needs of the colleggal 
group, When the activities of one group are directly determined 
by the needs of a second group within the same organization, the 
first group is coupled to, and i n  service to, the second group. 
Definition: Internal Coupling. An internally coupled 
bureaucracy is a formal organization which contains two or more 
authority patterns, one in service to the other. 
An organization is a complex one 
The function of the admin- 
Tho nature of the activities performed by the adminis- 
The when and why of internally coupled organizations can be 
understood by looking at the organization from the owner's point 
of view. He has a need to maintain procedures at the specified 
end of the continuum, and to store resources in their most speci- 
fic form if he is to maximize coordination. Should achievement of 
his goal require the use of volitional resources for whom he 
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cannot specify procedures then a c o l l e g i a l  coordinating mechanism 
may be optimal for maximizing the  bene f i t s  of coordination. 
Should the  colleagues requi re  some services o r  funct ions t o  be 
performed f o r  which procedures can be spec i f ied  (and these  are of 
s u f f i c i e n t  number and size t o  make ft economically o r  psychologi- 
c a l l y  feas ib le ) ,  t he  r a t i o n a l  owner w i l l  couple a small, more com- 
p l e t e  bureaucracy t o  the  c o l l e g i a l  group t o  perform those functions.  
Under these  condi t ions,  t h e  Complete Bureaucracy i s  i n  the  se rv ice  
of the  colleagues and t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s  are determined by the  needs 
of the  colleagues.  
On t h e  o ther  hand, when the Owner of a Complete Bureaucracy, 
f o r  b e t t e r  a t ta inment  of h i s  goals, requi res  t he  performance of 
some! funct ions where he cannot specify procedures, then he w i l l  
couple a colleague au tho r i ty  pa t t e rn  t o  h i s  executive au tho r i ty  
pa t t e rn ,  and the  activit ies of t h e  colleagues w i l l  be determined 
by t* needs of t he  Complete Bureaucracy. A research and devel- 
opment d iv i s ion  whose research objec t ives  a r e  es tab l i shed  by the  
sales organizat ion is a case in point.  
3 
Another s o r t  of coupling occurs when the  services of two 
kinds of bureaucracies are needed t o  produce a good o r  a se rv ice  
b u t  t he  Owner of one of t he  bureaucracies does not s t o r e  i n  
s p e c i f i c  form a l l  the  resources necessary t o  s t a f f  two bureauc- 
racies. An example of t h i s  type of coupling might be a manu- 
f a c t u r e r  who needs the  serv ices  of a market research organization. 
He does not need them frequent ly  enough t o  i n t e r n a l l y  couple so 
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he momentarily converts  some general  r e souecesd to  s p e c i f i c  ones 
by h i r i n g  an independent research group. 
e x t e r n a l  coupling, 
Such a s i t u a t i o n  w e  c a l l  
Definit ion: External  Coupling. Externa l ly  coupled bureauc- 
racies are formal organizat ions where one bureaucracy s p e c i f i e s  
o r  approves the  procedures (or determines the  goals)  of the  other .  
External  coupling by specifying o r  approving procedures occurs 
when an organizat ion l i k e  Sears Roebuck h i r e s  a "job shop!! t o  make 
a p a r t  f o r  one of i t s  appliances. 
are spec i f i ed  o r  approved through Sears '  s e t t i n g  up minimum re- 
quirements. 
k e t  research  organizat ion i l l u s t r a t e s  ex te rna l  coupling through 
goal  determination. 
tween i n t e r n a l  and ex te rna l  coupling. 
e x t e r n a l  coupling no v o l i t i o n a l  resources  are common t o  both 
organizat ions.  The second is t h a t  i n t e r n a l  coupling always in-  
volves  two d i f f e r e n t  au tho r i ty  p a t t e r n s  while ex te rna l  coupling 
may occur between organizat ions having similar or d i f f e r e n t  author- 
i t y  pa t te rns .  One f u r t h e r  d i s t i n c t i o n  must be made which concerns 
t h e  d i f f e rence  between ex te rna l  coupling and two independent or- 
ganiza t ions  wi th  one simply buying the  goods o r  services of t he  
o ther .  when t h e  bureaucracy i n  service t o  the  o the r  cannot exist 
without  the dominant organizat ion t h e  t w o  o rganiza t ions  are i n  an 
e x t e r n a l l y  coupled re la t ionship .  I n  o ther  words the  dominant 
bureaucracy must have an o l igopsonis t ic  r e l a t i o n s h i p  wi th  t h e  
The "job shop's" procedures 
The earlier example of a manufacturer h i r i n g  a mar- 
These examples h igh l igh t  two d i f f e rences  be- 
The f i r s t  one is t h a t  i n  
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bureaucracy to which it is externally coupled. 
A third type of complex organization is the decentralized 
organization. As we use it, decentralization is related to the de- 
gree of autonomy across organizational units. Autonomy is equated 
with the extent to which the activities of one component of the 
organization are independent sf tQe activities of other components 
of the organization. 
zational unit is autonomous varies inversely with the degree to 
In other words, the degree to which an organi- 
which its activities are coordinated with other organizational unfts. 
The autonomy of an organizational unit theoretically can vary 
from total interdependence to almost total independence. Total 
independence of organizational components would be indicative of 
separate organizations rather than one decentralized organization. 
e 
If all organizational units, however autonomous, are somewhat less 
than totally independent then there must be interdependent areas 
which require coordination. This necessitates a central bureauc- * 
racy which coordinates the activitsbes of the autonomous units * 
wherever feasible, and which performs other noncoordinating func- 
2s tions to take advantage of the economies of scale. Based on 
these assumptions we define the decentralized organization as 
follows: 
Definition: Decentralization. A decentralized bureaucracy 
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i s  a formal organizat ion when it  cons i s t s  of two o r  more s e m i -  
autonomous u n i t s ,  n e i t h e r  of which i s  i n  se rv i ce  t o  t h e  o the r ,  
Autonomy arises when a uni t  manager not only i s  given d i s -  
c r e t i o n  over t h e  u n i t ' s  procedures but  also i s  given d i s c r e t i o n  
over t h e  conversion of general  resources to  s p e c i f i c  ones. 
a manager i s  given a goal and spec i f i c  resources t o  use i n  achiev- 
I f  
ing  t h a t  goal ,  h i s  range of a c t i v i t i e s  i s  much more c u r t a i l e d  than 
when he  i s  given general  resources t o  use at  h i s  own d i s c r e t i o n  i n  
achieving t h e  owner's goal,  The former condi t ion w e  consider  as 
de lega t ion  and t h e  l a t te r  as autonomy, 
s i n g l e  enucleated bureaucrat ic  s t ruc tu re27  while ;autonomy leads t o  
two o r  more semi-independent organizat ional  u n i t s .  
manager au tho r i ty  t o  independently eonvert  resources i s ,  i n  e f f e c t ,  
e s t ab l i sh ing  a semi-independent organiza t iona l  un i t .  
Delegation r e s u l t s  i n  a 
Granting a 
The degree of  organizat ional  decen t r a l i za t ion  can be  measured 
by t h e  degree of autonomy given t o  Organizational u n i t s ,  
t h e  amount of general  resources over which t h e  u n i t ' s  manager has 
cont ro l .  
c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  i s  determined by t h e  amount of general  resources 
which managers are permitted t o  a l l o c a t e  without approval from t h e  
owner o r  h i s  ch ief  operat ing executive,  divided by t h e  t o t a l  
That i s ,  
S ta ted  more formally,  t h e  degree of organizat ional  de- 
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resources  of t h e  organization.28 
decent ra l ized  can be determined as follows: t h e  general  resources 
of t h e  sub-unit which can be al located by t h e  manager of t h e  u n i t  
without t h e  permission of e i t h e r  t h e  owner o r  of any o the r  mana- 
g e r s ,  divided by t h e  t o t a l  resources of t h e  un i t .  
When he decent ra l izes ,  the owner gives up cont ro l  over some 
o f  h i s  resources. As a consequence t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of usurpat ion 
i s  increased and some po ten t i a l  bene f i t s  from coordinat ion are 
foregone. Thus, decent ra l iza t ion  involves c o s t s  which, f o r  t h e  
r a t i o n a l  owner, must be o f f s e t  by gains  r e s u l t i n g  from decen t r a l i -  
The extent  t o  which a sub-unit is  
-=tion. We contend t h a t - t h e  poten t ia l  bene f i t s  from decen t r a l i za t ion  
increase  as t he  necess i ty  f o r  rapid response increases .  
w e  w i l l  demonstrate t h a t  t h e  necessi ty  f o r  decen t r a l i za t ion  arises 
as a r e s u l t  of t i m e  pressures.  
I n  f a c t ,  
We hypothesize that  decent ra l iza t ion  arises as a function of 
t h e  complexity of t h e  organizat ion 's  i n t e r a c t i o n  with i t s  ex terna l  
environment and t h e  r a p i d i t y  with which t h e  organizat ion must re- 
spond t o  t h a t  environment, As we have s t a t e d ,  complex i n t e r a c t i o n  
r e s u l t s  e i t h e r  from procedural o r  environmental complexity. 
f u r t h e r  hypothesize t h a t  t h e  optimal form of decen t r a l i za t ion  
d i f f e r s  as a funct ion of t h e  d i f f e ren t  kinds of complexity, When 
We 
32 
procedures are so complex t h a t  a g r e a t  dea l  of t i m e  i s  required 
i n  order  t o  specify the  appropriate  responses, one way of saving 
t i m e  i s  t o  spec i fy  some of t h e  complex procedures simultaneously 
r a t h e r  than sequent ia l ly .  
components of t he  organizat ion t o  s p e c i a l i z e  i n  a set of pro- 
cedures leading t o  achievement of sub-goals. I n  t h i s  way each 
component simultaneously s p e c i f i e s  the  procedures f o r  its sub- 
goal achievement. Presumably, near simultaneous achievement of ' 
t h e  set of sub-goals r e s u l t s  i n  achievement of the organiza t ion ' s  
over -a l l  goal. 
aphis can be accomplished by allowing 
Organization of autonomous u n i t s  around s e t s  of d i f f e r e n t  
sub-goals is ,  i n  e f f e c t ,  func t iona l  decen t r a l i za t ion ,  as example 
of which might be Sco t t  Paper Company, which has timber, paper 
processing, and paper tawel divis ions.  A l l  the  d iv i s ions  spec i fy  
t h e i r  own sets of complex procedures and they do so simultaneously. 
However, s ince  the  supply and demand of t he  u n i t s  a f f e c t  one another  
their  a c t i v i t i e s  must be i n t e r r e l a t e d  i f  the  f i n a l  products are t o  
be e f f i c i e n t l y  produced. 
c e n t r a l  bureaucracy. 
That coordinat ion is provided by a 
When complex i n t e r a c t i o n  a r i s e s  from environmental complexity 
and response must be rapid,  decis ion t i m e  can be reduced by set- 
t i n g  up p a r a l l e l  bureaucracies  so t h a t  each bureaucracy can dea l  
w i th  a segment of the  environment. (%he environment can be seg- 
mented on the  b a s i s  of population or geographical d i f fe rences ,  
o r  on any o ther  re levant  cha rac t e r i s t i c . )  This has the  e f f e c t  of 
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reducing the  number of h i e ra rch ie s  through which information from 
t h e  environment must pass. 
supermarket chain. 
alloegments of the  population the number of adminis t ra t ive  l e v e l s  
would be g r e a t e r  than i f  p a r a l l e l  bureaucracies were set up, each 
t o  handle one population segment. 
of managers a t  each l e v e l  (one of the  c o s t s  of decent ra l iza t ion) ,  
bu t  fewer leve ls .  Though each orders  from a c e n t r a l  warehouse, 
t h e  bureaucracies are pa ra l l e l ed  because each one semi-independent- 
l y  buys, sells and d isp lays  i t s  own merchandise. Each of the m e r -  
chandising decis ions i s  dupl icated,  and each dec is ion  is  simul- 
taneortisEy and independently a r r ived  a t  by t h e  p a r a l l e l  bureauc- 
racies. 
t i v e l y  l i t t l e  e f f e c t  on another,  l i t t l e  coordinat ion i s  required 
of  t he  c e n t r a l  bureaucracy. The r o l e  of the  c e n t r a l  bureaucracy 
i s  pr imar i ly  t o  prevent usurpation, and t o  maximize the  economies 
o f  scale. 
might be a f f ec t ed  i f  the  c e n t r a l  bureaucracy buys s t a p l e  i t e m s  
f o r  na t iona l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  while l o c a l  u n i t s  determine t h e  weekly 
spec ia l s .  
Le t  us take a s impl i f ied  view of a 
I f  a Complete Bureaucracy were t o  dea l  wi th  
This r e s u l t s  i n  a l a r g e r  number 
Since the  acts of one p a r a l l e l  bureaucracy have r e l a -  
In the case of our supermarket cha in  such an economy 
The advantages of p a r a l l e l  bureaucracies  i n  dea l ing  wi th  an 
uns tab le  environment become apparent i f  one makes two assump- 
t ions .  F i r s t ,  t h a t  knowledge of changes i n  the  environment e n t e r s  
t he  organizat ion through the  bottom l aye r s  and travels through 
t h e  intermediate  ones t o  the  top layers .  Seconds t h a t  t he  time 
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necessary f o r  a given quant i ty  of information t o  pass through a 
l a y e r  of bureaucracy is a constant.  Under these  assumptions, as 
one adds o r  sub t r ac t s  a bureaucrat ic  layer ,  t he re  is a correspond- 
ing  arithmetic increase  or decrease i n  the  time required t o  per- 
ceive, i n i t i a t e  and evaluate  new procedures t o  cope with an en- 
vironmental change. This can be  illustrated by comparing a two 
\ 4-s d 
with  a t h r e e  l aye r  bureaucracy. 
lower level: (1) repor t s  an environmental change t o  the  upper 
level; (2)  t h e  upper l e v e l  spec i f i e s  a new procedure t o  dea l  wi th  
t h e  changed environment, and (3) t he  lower l e v e l  r epor t s  on the  
adeqwcy of the  new procedure. 
been consumed. 
s t e p s  requi res  t w o  communication time uui t8 ,  o r  six t i m e  un i t s ,  
I n  the  two l aye r  bureaucracy t h e  
Three conmnunication t i m e  u n i t s  hove 
I n  a t h r e e  layer  bureaucracy each of the  th ree  
t o  complete t h e  cycle.  This is i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  Table 3. 
I n  the  same t i m e  that  a two l eve l  bureaucracy can make and evalu- 
ate th ree  independent changes, a four  l e v e l  bureaucracy can in-  
s t i t u t e  and evaluate only one procedural change, 
.._ . -  h 
The major b e n e f i t s  from poralle1,decentralization r e s u l t  from 
* 
processing information through fewer h i e ra rch ic  leve ls .  However, as 
because the  p a r a l l e l  bureaacracies  a l s o  are simultaneously speci-  
fy ing  procedures there  is a time saving i n  response rates. Func- 
t i o n  decen t r a l i za t ion ,  on the  other  hand, der ives  i t s  major b e n e f i t s  
. . . ", 
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from the savings in response rates due to simultaneous specifica- 
tion of procedures, and this situation, too, has secondary bene- 
fits. If a single bureaucratic unit were to specify a l l  the com- 
plex procedures, a larger number of hierarchies would be necessary 
so functional decentralization realizes some benefits from more 
rapid information processing. 
Since both forms of decentralization (differentially) elim- 
inate some hierarchic levels between the owner and the producers, 
the distinction between these organizational forms and enuclea- 
tion may not be entirely clear. 
ferent coordinating mechanisms used by these organizations. 
ordination in an enucleated bureaucracy is accomplished by the 
colleagues who form themselves into a single bureaucratic unit 
for that purpose while coordination in a decentralized organiza- 
tion is achieved within and between multiple semi-autonomous units. 
The distinction rests on the dif- 
Co- 
A collegial system dependent upon the emergence of consensus 
requires considerably more time for decision making than does a 
small number of single executives, each independently making de- 
cisions. A single coordination mechanism , however, is better 
able to allocate resources across the entire organization. On 
the other hand, a decentralized mechanism enables more rapid re- 
sponse but limits the extent of coordination. Whether enucleation 
or decentralization is optimal depends on the necessity for 
rapid decisions about resources. 
In summary, the decision to decentralize and extent of 
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decentralization is a function of a) the necessity for rapid speci- 
fication of procedures and rapid resource decisions, and b) the de- 
gree of complexity of the interaction between the organization and 
its environment. Slow response, given the necessity for rapid 
response,is costly, 
fits gained from coordination the resQft is a decentralieed or- 
ganization. 
we hypothesize that functional decentralization will occur where 
each unit simultaneously specifies a set of procedures to attain 
When slow response costs more than the bene- 
When the slow response is due to procedural complexity 
a part of the organization's goal. In order for the over-a11 goal 
t o  be efficiently attained the central bureaucracy must coordinate 
to some extent the efforts of the functionally decentralized units. 
Parallel decentralization results from environmental compkexity, 
where each of the duplicated bureaucracies achieves a miniature 
of the over-all goal of the organization. 
the central bureaucracy is to take advantage of economies of 
scale in purchasing and allocating resources commonly used by 
the parallel units. 
The major function of 
In developing this typology for purposes of exposition we 
have dealt more or less with pure organizational forms. Before 
concluding this section on complex organizational patterns, we 
will try to point out just how complex these patterns can become. 
In an organization with autonomous units, the central bureaucracy 
may have one type of structure while the decentralized units have 
other structures, For instance, a university may have an enucleated 
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dominant bureaucracy (colleagues) and a series of parallel bureauc- 
racies (research projects), each of which may approximate a Complete, 
Enucleated, or Truncated Bureaucracy. Each of these parallel 
bureaucracies, in turn, may have decentralized units. Another ex- 
ample might be General Motors, where some partsof the organization 
are decentralized on the basis of function and others on the basis 
of environmental differences, while still other parts remgin under 
the direct control of the central bureaucracy. Obviously, there 
are a very large number of possible combinations of organizational 
units. 
In presenting this taxonomy we hope that we have accomplished 
two things. First, that ordering organizations on the basis of 
our schema provides insight into the relationship between struc- 
ture and authority patterns. Second, that we have increased our 
understanding of the environmental conditions which lead-bo the 
emergence of these patterns. 
complexity by the use of two structural variables p&s three en- 
vironmental variables is an oversimplification which is bound to 
leave many facets of organizations unexplained. We hope, however, 
that the taxonomy here presented will provide a basis for sub- 
sequent elaboration. 
variable, visibility of consequences. Based on these major vari- 
ables we then will attempt to elaborate the dynamic aspects of a 
theory of f o w l  organizations. Organizational conflict, change, 
usurpation, innovation, g o d  structures and informal organizations 
The attempt to impose order on such 
In a future paper, we will define a tMrd 
- 2  
x-  - 
38 
will be discussed and some empirical evidence will be presented 
in support of our contentions. 
J 
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'lsimon writes 1 1 . .  .a 
enforce the conformity of 
primary function of organization is to 
the individual to norms laid down by 
the group, or by its authority wielding members," H. Simon, "De- 
cision Making and Administrative Organization," Public Administration 
Review, IV, Winter, 1944, p. 18. We see the right to demand cer- 
tain kinds of behavior qs the distinguishing feature between 
property right and social norm, for the social norm is the right 
to expect behavior. 
w -1, , 
l2 This definition of "professional" differs from many com- 
monly accepted definitions. See, for example, T. Parsons, "The 
Professions and Social Structure," SOC. Forces, 17 (May, 1939) j 
E, C. $ughes, --I&, and Their 'Work (qlea?Qs4 ~ I l k ~ ~ s r  The, i r .  
Free Press, 1958) ; E. Greenwood, "Attributes of a Profession, It 
in S. Nosow and W. H. Form (eds.), Man, Work and Society (New 
York: Basic Books, 1962). Most of these definitions combine 
role perquisites and social evaluations of the role as determiners 
of professionalism. Since modern society is characterized by 
rapid technological and social change, social evaluations of 
roles frequently neglect changes in the role demands. Our def- 
inition bases increasing or decreasing professionalism on func- 
tions within the organization, and thereby avoids cultural lag 
in role evaluations. 
130ur definition and use of resources was influenced by 
3ames Thgupson and Frederick L. Bates, "Technology, Organization 
and Administration," Admin. Sci. Q., 1957, pp. 325-43. 
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l40ur use of specified procedure is akin to March and Simon's 
concept of programmed activity. 
Simon, Organizations. (New York: Wiley, 1958). 
James G. March and Herbert A. 
15Max Weber, "The Essentials of Bureaucratic Organization: 
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H. Selvin (eds.), Reader in Bureaucracy (Glencoe, Illinois: The 
Free Press, 1952), p. 21. 
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20Thomas L. Whisler, "Measuring Centralization of Control 
in Business Organizations," in W. Cooper, H. Leavitt and Shelly 
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210ur thinking on the Truncated Bureaucracy was greatly in- 
fluenced by Arthur L. Stinchcombe, "Bureaucratic and Craft 
Administration of Production," Admin. Sci. Q.$ 4 (1959). 
221n instances where the managerial skills required are so 
simple that they are abundantly available, the managerial functions 
are performed by temporary employees. 
this type of organization acts like a Complete Bureaucracy. 
In terms of its dynamics, 
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23Marcson has defined t h i s  au thor i ty  pa t t e rn  a s  a "system of 
cont ro l  i n  which au tho r i ty  is  shared by a l l  members of the working 
group. Authority is deemed t o  rest i n  the group r a t h e r  than i n  
an individual ."  Simon Marcson, "Decision Making i n  a University 
Physics Department," h e r .  Behav. S c i e n t i s t ,  VI, No. 4 (December, 
1962), 38. 
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25011r development of optimal forms of organization, a s  w e l l  as 
our  l a t e r  treatment of  decent ra l iza t ion ,  is heavily dependent on 
March and Simon's discussion of the r e l a t ionsh ip  between complex 
dnvironments and organizat ional  search behavior. March and Simon, 
op: c i t .  
If, f o r  instance,  a s ing le  standardized pa r t  is needed by 
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a l l  t he  autonomous u n i t s ,  then purchase of enough p a r t s  f o r  a l l  
the  units by  the  cen t r a l  bureaucracy can result i n  savings. 
27The col leagues would be autonomous, rather than forming a 
single bureaucrat ic  s t r u c t u r e ,  if each had a proport ionate  share  
of the  organiza t ion ' s  resources t o  do w i t h  as he wished. Gen- 
e r a l l y ,  the  col leages j o i n t l y  decide on the  conversion of gen- 
e r a l  resources t o  specific ones, i.e.) they form a s i n g l e  
Bureaucratic s t r u c t u r e  i n  order  t o  coordinate.  Similar ly ,  par t -  
ners  i n  a law firm would be completely autonomous i f  no resources 
were control led by t h e  par tnership s u i  generis.  
U s e  of general  resources/total resources makes it poss ib le  28 
t o  develop measures of t he , ex ten t  of decent ra l iza t ion ,  i.e., which 
43 
l e v e l  has d i scre t ion  and which does not .  
tr ibut ion of power o r  discret ion a t  an individual l e v e l  a l s o  could 
be derived with these  concepts, 
Measures of the  d i s -  
44 
Table 1 
Function and manner of performance 
of four organizational roles 
Manner of performance 
Disc ret ion No discretion 
Coordinator Manager Bureaucrat 
Producer Professional Worker 
Function 
Table 2 
The determinants of bureaucratic type and 
associated authority patterns 
De  t erminant s Bureaucratic type Authority pattern 
*wR+ Complete bureaucracy Execut ive 
EYR- Truncated bureaucracy Execut ive-Exte rnal 
P-R+ Enucleated bureaucracy Colleague 
P- R- No organization possible None 
*F+ 
P- a low proportion; R+ a high propprtion gf stored speci- 
f i c  resources, R- a low proportion. 




Communication rime and bureaucratic levels 
Level A Level A 
Level B 
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Level C 
I 
\ 
